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UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET THREAT:
THE NECESSITY OF ANALYZING SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT AND ACTIONS FROM A SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

by

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Understanding the Soviet Threat: The Necessity of Analyzing Soviet Military Thought and Actions from a Soviet Perspective

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., University of South Carolina, 1982

Submitted in partial fullfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

In order to evaluate the Soviet officer's actions in war properly, it is not only necessary to know his order of battle and capabilities but also to have some understanding of his preconceptions and values in the thought and decision-making processes and to evaluate his actions from that perspective. To project American values into Soviet military thought is unacceptable due to the conflicting ideological bases of the Soviet and American cultures. Proper interpretation of Soviet military thought must include an understanding of its foundation in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet/Russian culture, as well as of its concepts such as military doctrine, science, and art. All of these are radically different from their U.S. counterparts. This thesis is written as a primer for U.S. military officers, all of whom require a fundamental understanding of the Soviet perspective.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION: KNOW THE ENEMY----------8

A. PERCEIVING THE ENEMY----------9

B. WHO SHOULD PERCEIVE?----------10

C. ORGANIZATION----------11

II. MARXIST-LENINIST FOUNDATION----------13

A. DEFINITION OF MARXISM-LENINISM----------15

B. ORIGINS OF THE IDEOLOGY----------18

C. CRITICISM OF THE IDEOLOGY----------25

III. CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES----------28

A. RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION----------28

B. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER----------30

C. THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN MENTALITIES----------34

D. THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPERIENCE----------41

IV. THE SOVIET SERVICEMAN----------44

A. INDOCTRINATION, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION-------45

B. LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE----------52

V. SOVIET VERSUS U.S. MILITARY CONCEPTS----------57

A. MILITARY DOCTRINE----------58

B. MILITARY SCIENCE----------62

C. MILITARY ART----------65

VI. SOVIET VERSUS U.S. CONCEPTS OF WAR----------75

A. MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY ON WAR AND THE ARMY---77

B. THE LANGUAGES OF WAR----------86

VII. CONCLUSION----------95

APPENDIX: MILITARY INDOCTRINATION AND SERVICE----------101

LIST OF REFERENCES----------103

BIBLIOGRAPHY----------109

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST----------112

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to provide the U.S. military officer with a basic understanding of Soviet military thought and its differences from U.S. military thought. It does not attempt to present any new hypotheses or analyses of Soviet military affairs. Nor does it presume to be an all-encompassing study of the Soviet Armed Forces. It should be used primarily as an introduction for the officer who does not have a sound knowledge of Soviet perceptions of military affairs and war. The author's motivation in preparing this thesis was his own lack of understanding as a line officer whose formal education on the Soviet Armed Forces (before attending the Naval Postgraduate School) had been exclusively in hardware capabilities and weapons parameters. There is little knowledge among U.S. officers of how the Soviets think and prepare for war.

The sources used in this study were purposely limited to open literature so that the reader might conduct further research on the topic. Hopefully the information presented here and the sources in the List of References and Bibliography will aid in the professional development of those readers interested in expanding their knowledge of Soviet military thought.

I. INTRODUCTION: KNOW THE ENEMY

> Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. . . . If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.
>
> Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Sun Tzu's advice has not always been properly applied in the United States, where "knowing the enemy" has become a quantitative analysis of hardware capabilities, a "bean count" of ours and theirs which offers little explanation for the enemy's intentions. Such a view is incomplete in the field of threat analysis (or net assessment), which must include an understanding of the enemy's ideology, culture, and language. These are the factors which affect the thought and decision-making processes and thus determine how the enemy will use his hardware.

There is undoubtedly controversy over why it is important to know anything more about the enemy than his physical combat capabilities and one's own ability to counter them. In the U.S. this requirement is necessitated by radical differences between American military thought and that of its primary adversary, the Soviet Union.

In order to evaluate the Soviet officer's thoughts and actions, it is not only necessary to know his order of battle and capabilities but also to have some understanding of his preconceptions and values in the thought and

decision-making processes and to evaluate his actions from that perspective. To project Western values into Soviet military thought is unacceptable due to the conflicting ideological bases of the Soviet and American cultures.

A. "PERCEIVING" THE ENEMY

In this context, "threat perception" must be studied as a component of threat analysis. It is perception which determines who the enemy is, the extent of his capabilities, and how he will use them. Most importantly, perceptions are not universal but are learned through values and channels of influence which vary greatly between societies. These differing values ultimately determine a nation's military objectives and thus form the basis for development of the armed forces.

In the United States, perhaps the fundamental problem of threat perception is an unwillingness of the nation to even recognize that an enemy exists. The task of getting the "national interest" to recognize a threat is not easily accomplished in this democratic, increasingly individualistic, geographically isolated society. Even the leadership often assumes an attitude that the USSR has become less antagonistic and truly wants to maintain an American notion of "peaceful coexistence." The Soviets, however, make it no secret that they are indeed the undying enemy of the Capitalist states.

Even when Americans recognize an enemy they do not always understand the context of his language. Soviet literature is riddled with key-words and phrases of very precise definition and contextual application. When an English language equivalent exists (which is not always the case), the definition can be easily misunderstood. English terms such as "peaceful coexistence," "detente," and even "strategy" and "tactics" have quite different meanings from their Russian language counterparts.

Proper U.S. interpretation of this language of Soviet military thought must be accompanied by an understanding of its foundation in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviet/Russian culture. With this critical basis of knowledge one can begin to predict Soviet thoughts and actions on the field of battle.

B. WHO SHOULD "PERCEIVE"?

There is of course debate over who should be concerned with capabilities and intentions. In the U.S., capabilities are traditionally a military concern while political leaders deal with intentions [Ref. 1: p. 65]. Such a division of labor in threat analysis cannot, however, eliminate the necessity for the military commander to interpret the Soviets' intentions and resulting actions when encountered in both peacetime and battle.

To understand the enemy from his own perspective requires constant education which must begin with junior officers and continue throughout a military career. This is not to suggest that all officers should be political-military subspecialists, but that all officers must have at least a fundamental understanding of those factors which influence the enemy's thoughts and decisions. This understanding is particularly important when encountering Soviet military thought because it enables an officer to

> more quickly perceive what the Soviets are up to if he has a reasonable appreciation of the strategy underlying their tactics. Without this appreciation, he may make the critical mistake many officers make in mirror-imaging their own operational and tactical leadership views onto their Soviet counterparts. A junior officer with an appreciation of strategic thought will understand the importance of including in his thoughts the cultures of the two countries. [Ref. 2: p. 133]

Thus, this thesis is written for the U.S. military officer who requires an understanding of the Soviet perspective. Many of the concepts included here are in themselves entire academic disciplines in the Soviet Union. The volume of literature available on Soviet military thought is inexhaustible and constantly growing. Hopefully this study will serve as a primer for pursuing the endless task of "Understanding the Soviet Threat."

C. ORGANIZATION

In pursuing this understanding it will first be necessary to define and explain the origin and basic tenets

of that entity which affects all aspects of Soviet life and thought: Marxism-Leninism. Second, the influence of the Russian "national character" will be combined with that of the ideology in a presentation of Soviet and American mentalities and the Soviet military experience. The effect of these influences on the Soviet officer will then be reviewed in the context of Soviet political-military indoctrination, training and education, and styles of leadership and initiative.

This understanding of the Soviet officer's thoughts, decisions, and actions will enable the reader better to assume a Soviet perspective in studying the differences between such Soviet and U.S. concepts as military doctrine, military science, and military art (and its components of strategy, operational art, and tactics). This will be followed by a similar review of Soviet and U.S. concepts of war. The importance of avoiding value-projection and cultural biases will be integral to this discussion which will include an application of the current policies of glasnost [openness] and perestroyka [restructuring] and the effect they are likely to have on the Soviet military.

The conclusion will address briefly the resemblance between the military structure and the ideology, the combined arms concept of the Soviet Armed Forces, and will include a prescription for study of the Soviet perspective.

II. MARXIST-LENINIST FOUNDATION

> The decisive element in the training of officer personnel is their ideological hardening, arming them with Marxist-Leninist theory. Only on the basis of materialist dialectics and a profound understanding of the laws of social development, can officer personnel correctly understand the objective laws of modern wars, their political and technical character and features, master all the forms and means of armed combat, and advance the cause of Soviet military science.
>
> V. M. Domnikov, The Officer's Handbook

This statement might seem puzzling to a U.S. officer, as it equates to telling him that intensive training on the Declaration of Independence and the democratic tradition which it preserves are his decisive prerequisites for going into combat. Because equating combat effectiveness with a knowledge of ideology is an unusual proposition from an American perspective, the obvious reaction is to assume that such statements are simply patriotic rhetoric which are accepted but not always believed or applied in one's daily routine. A more accurate observation is that while every Soviet officer is not a professor of Marxism-Leninism, he cannot be unaffected by its constant presence. Its role is similar to religious upbringing in the U.S., that of "a powerful force that must be dealt with even if the adult no longer practices the faith. In both religion and ideology, certain truths are accepted as articles of faith." [Ref. 3: p. 41]

In the Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist indoctrination begins in grammar school and remains omnipresent throughout life. The ideology provides the justification for rationalizing every decision and policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Lenin's Complete Collected Works include over 50 volumes which can be quoted in whatever context is necessary. Even if a citizen (or servicemember) is apathetic towards the never-ending slogans and propaganda, he cannot publicly speak out against them. More relevant is the necessity of the military to reflect the ideology and support the CPSU. As the "keeper" of Marxism-Leninism, the CPSU has a vested interest in ensuring that its teachings are very prevalent in the Soviet military, which secures the Party's power [Ref. 4: p. 32].

Proceeding from this position that the Soviet military officer is indeed profoundly influenced by Marxist-Leninist concepts, it becomes necessary to understand what these influences are. It will soon be evident that Marxism-Leninism is not rhetoric, but the foundation for military doctrine and science. It is, from a Soviet perspective, "the scientific methodology, which gives Soviet military science its preeminent place in the world and its assurance of superiority over Western military theory." [Ref. 5: p. ii]

A. DEFINITION OF MARXISM-LENINISM

There is no equivalent in the United States to this "scientific" view of the world which is defined as

> the science of the cognition and revolutionary transformation of the world: of the laws governing the development of society, nature and human thought; of the laws of the revolutionary struggle of the working class and of the methods of overthrowing capitalism and building the new socialist society. [Ref. 6: p. 33]

A review of Marxist-Leninist ideology is never pleasant for an American because its concepts are completely foreign to his own thought process. Consequently, most Americans would write off the above definition as meaningless Communist propaganda. Such a dismissal would be a grave error because the phrases and key words in this definition have very precise meanings which explain the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. This ideology is considered a science with immutable laws rather than an ideological theory. It is supreme to all other scientific theories and laws. For example, the study of Einstein's theory of relativity was forbidden until forty years ago because it allegedly contradicted Marxism [Ref. 7: p. 27].

In the most fundamental terms, Marxism-Leninism considers the world and all its elements to be in constant turmoil. History is seen as predetermined and leads to the inevitable triumph of Communism, a "worker's paradise." This paradise is the better world of an atheistic ideology which does not believe in the hereafter. Capitalism (led by

the United States) is the only entity blocking the achievement of true Communism. Therefore, peace and the end of the struggle will not come about until Capitalism has been defeated. In fact, the Russian word mir, which translates into English as peace, is actually "a higher state of the world that cannot exist until capitalism has been eliminated and worldwide communism has triumphed." [Ref. 3: p. 40] The Soviets consider "everlasting peace among nations, the elimination of wars and preparation for them" to be the "international principle of communist society and one of the great ideals for which communists struggle." [Ref. 8: p. 624]

Of further importance in a fundamental understanding of the ideology is its concept of the "class" nature of warfare. In light of the above principle, the Soviets do not view peace with the United States (a nation) as impossible, only peace with the Capitalists (a class) and their "bourgeois ideology." To this end, Communists give themselves the right to conduct international relations with other parties, organizations, and classes of peoples, to "foment dissent," and "organize opposition to elected governments." [Ref. 3: p. 40] Such relations are conducted through the International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee, which enables Party officials to

> meet with sympathetic political leaders, recruit local government officials, conduct propaganda and "disinformation" campaigns, and instruct local surrogates on Soviet policies. [Ref. 9: p. 47]

This department is now headed by Anatoly Dobrynin, long time Soviet Ambassador to the United States, indicating a possible increased importance of U.S. affairs in such work.

Finally, Marxism-Leninism is in no hurry to defeat Capitalism. Because history is predetermined, events will eventually work in favor of the forces of Communism. The leadership simply has the role of "guiding" history towards the inevitable. In this context there can even be failure and temporary compromise so long as they do not affect the ultimate victory.

This introduction to Marxism-Leninism provides only a superficial and still incomplete review of its beliefs. To continue studying the ideology and its primary concept of "dialectical materialism" (the meaning of which shall soon be evident) requires a knowledge of its origin. Marxism-Leninism was not developed entirely from the thoughts of either Karl Marx or Vladimir Il'ich Lenin but paradoxically has its roots in the same period as does the American Democratic tradition: the eighteenth-century Age of Enlightenment.

While a historical review of this period may at first seem irrelevant to the U.S. officer's understanding of Soviet military thought, the ideas of this period had a

direct influence on present-day Marxism-Leninism. A knowledge of these ideas will enable the reader to better understand the military's foundation in, and practice of, the ideology.

B. ORIGINS OF THE IDEOLOGY

1. Democratic and Socialist Origins

The Age of Enlightenment was a period when European philosophy and social thought was greatly influenced by the emerging Industrial Revolution. All previously accepted ideas and institutions were questioned on the basis of "pure reason." [Ref. 10: p. 521] The Enlightenment brought forth the origins of political and social democracy in the works of philosophers such as John Locke (from seventeenth-century England), Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Louis, Baron de Montesquieu (both from eighteenth-century France). The resulting "natural rights philosophy" and "humanitarianism" of the period included the concept of the inalienable rights of man to "life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness." The government became the instrument of the state in securing and protecting these rights for the citizens, who could revolt if the government failed in this aim. [Ref. 4: p. 48]

In Germany, the foundation for Marxism-Leninism was also being laid in the works of Immanuel Kant and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, both eighteenth-century

philosophers. Kant studied the "limitations of human understanding and established the rationalism of pure experience." [Ref. 10: p. 522] His philosophy was that of a "humanistic idealism" which considered man to be perfectible. Hegel improved on Kant's philosophy of perfectibility and of "becoming," which stated that there was a future state of man which could not be comprehended in the present, but perhaps in the future. It was these two concepts, along with those of "alienation" and the "historical dialectic," which Marx borrowed from Hegel. [Ref. 11: pp. 1-2] Before continuing with Marx's interpretations of Hegel and Lenin's subsequent interpretations of Marx, the Hegelian philosophy of the historical dialectic, as it is practiced today in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, must be reviewed. This concept, while initially puzzling, is central to Marxism-Leninism and, consequently, Soviet military thought. Examples of practical military application of each law of the dialectic will provide the U.S. officer with an understanding of the crucial importance of this concept.

2. Laws of the Dialectic

Marxism-Leninism is based upon the three "laws of materialist dialectics" which are: the law of the unity and struggle of opposites, the law of the mutual conversion of quantitative and qualitative changes, and the law of the negation of the negation. Despite the seemingly vague

philosophical rhetoric of these concepts, they each have important practical uses at every level of military affairs, and are the vehicles by which the Soviets are continuing their progression to true Communism.

The first law explains that opposing tendencies are inherent within every entity and system, and that these opposites are in constant conflict. For example, the struggle between the conflicting Capitalist and Socialist states is constant until the demise of the former. Therefore, the Soviet view of "detente" is not an agreement between friendly nations, but simply a relaxation of tension in the ongoing struggle with Capitalism. It is in fact a continuation of war without armed conflict.

This law is easily applied to military affairs by understanding the conflict between opposing tendencies such as surprise versus preparation, massing versus dispersal, or offense versus defense. In dialectical terms, the "development of new offensive weapons has always inevitably led to the development of corresponding [defensive] countermeasures, and ultimately to the development of new modes of fighting . . . and war as a whole." [Ref. 12] This explains the existence of anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, anti-tank warfare, etc.

The second law contends that the quantitative accumulation of new factors eventually brings about qualitative change. In this context, the development of new

modes of fighting mentioned above does not occur "immediately upon the appearance of a new weapon, but only when they begin to be employed in a quantity which inevitably induces a new qualitative state of the phenomenon." For example, in World War I there were not enough tanks and aircraft to make a significant difference in the war. Yet their mass production after the war resulted in the development of "large tank and aviation combined units and formations," resulting in the qualitative change of military operations into the theory of "operations in depth" during World War II. [Ref. 12]

The third law of the dialectic, the "negation of the negation," is seen in terms of a thesis which is negated in the struggle with its antithesis, from which a synthesis evolves. This synthesis becomes the new thesis. Lenin saw this as an ongoing process until the final synthesis of Communism is reached through evolution from Capitalism (the thesis) through Socialism (the antithesis).

Again applied to military affairs, one weapon, combat system, or platform may be negated by another although "positive elements" of the original are carried over to the new and continue to improve. For example, naval vessels have evolved from oar-power to sail-power, to steam-power, to diesel and gas turbine power, and finally to nuclear power. [Ref. 12]

The previously mentioned concept of "alienation" is a direct result of the historical dialectic, which Marx later saw as dialectical materialism. Hegel believed that history was the process by which a world spirit, the Weltgeist, came to know itself and realize its eventual perfection. Man was the agent through which this realization occurred. Reality existed in the thoughts of the Weltgeist as a thesis through which man's thoughts materialized. Man then produced an object as the antithesis, which at this stage is alienated from the spirit. Through a synthesis, the spirit realizes the object as its own creation and becomes more perfect. At this point the cycle of "reality" continues. [Ref. 11: p. 2]

3. The Marxist Approach

Marx thought that Hegel's philosophy was "mystified." Therefore, he borrowed Hegel's ideas and used them in a context of "materialism." Marx and Friedrich Engels (a ninteenth-century German Socialist) believed that production gave rise to thought, rather than vice-versa. In this context, man was considered a compulsive producer. It was through this production that man realized his own perfectibility and increased his self-knowledge. Thus, man assumed the reality which Hegel had attributed to the Weltgeist. [Ref. 11: pp. 2-3]

In Marxist philosophy, man is alienated from his product, "the fruits of his labor," through class struggle.

This began when slave owners took the laborers' products as their own. Slavery and, subsequently, Feudalism and Capitalism have become known as the "modes of production." In each of these modes a privileged class has legitimized itself as the owner of the "means of production," which Marx believed should be common property. Communism is, of course, the conclusion of this struggle when man will be reunited with his products and achieve perfection. [Ref. 11: p. 3]

It was with this philosophy that Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto in 1848. "Workers of all countries, unite!" was their call for the world revolution which would defeat Capitalism. Marx's ideas of production and the economic foundation of society were further elaborated in the three volume work, Das Kapital, published between 1867 and 1895. Marx used his materialist philosophy to predict social developments such as a war emerging from the 1848 worker uprisings, the polarization of European society, and the defeat of nationalism; none of which have yet occurred [Ref. 3: pp. 38-39].

4. Lenin's Interpretations

Vladimir Il'ich Lenin is the "prophet" of Communism, "the brilliant successor to the revolutionary teachings of K. Marx and F. Engels, and the founder of our [Communist] Party and the Soviet state." [Ref. 13: p. 1] Lenin is all

but worshiped by the Soviet people, who line up daily to see his body in the mausoleum on Red Square. He is the man who

> having absorbed all the wisdom of the history of mankind . . . was able with all dialectical comprehensiveness to embrace the objective logic of the development of social events; and by the force of his brilliant intellect to expound on a new field of social processes to the most profound depths. [Ref. 13: p. 1]

Lenin saw the problems of Marxism and developed his own philosophy. He decided that the world revolution would occur in "the weakest links of Capitalism," vice industrialized nations. He also saw politics, vice economic conditions, at the foundation of society. [Ref. 3: p. 39] Lenin could not wait for the final "synthesis" and thus took it upon himself to organize the revolution which would bring about Communism. For this task he developed the Bolshevik (Majority) Party and literally seized power overnight. The Bolsheviks were, ironically, much smaller than the Mensheviks (Minority), and Lenin himself was astounded when the revolution succeeded. He truly believed that Capitalism would be defeated, as he considered it to be in its final stage: imperialism. Like those of Marx, however, Lenin's predictions of world revolution and the worker's paradise have not come to pass. The Soviet leadership does not always seem to adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. This has brought question to the basic hypothesis that the ideology is indeed the basis for all thought within the Soviet Union.

C. CRITICISM OF THE IDEOLOGY

Many analysts discount the power of Marxism-Leninism and contend that it is actually foreign to most nationalities within the USSR. The basis of this argument is that Marxism-Leninism is an "adopted worldview" which was imposed on the various cultures of the Soviet empire with the intention of "remaking that culture in a Marxist-Leninist image." [Ref. 4: p. 31] In supporting this argument one must remember that the Soviet Union is comprised of fifteen republics, once nations in their own right. It is an empire whose population includes over a hundred nationalities ranging from European and Asian to Middle Eastern. Although Great Russians are the largest single ethnic group and hold most of the Party power, their numbers are slipping to below 50 percent of the total population. There has been recent speculation on the decline of the ideology, an attitude that it has worn out its usefulness and run out of rationalizations if the USSR is to remain a superpower. In this respect, something must be done to revive the Soviet economy in particular, and Marxism-Leninism has no more answers.

The first rejection of these arguments is that there is no internal indication of such an ideological decline. Despite General Secretary Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroyka (which shall be presented in more detail later), current Soviet writings remain ideologically pure,

and Gorbachev himself is a strong purveyor of Marxism-Leninism. In fact, the ideology is ultimately all that keeps the CPSU in power. That is, Marxism-Leninism provides legitimacy for the Communist Party to prescribe the path towards achievement of the worker's paradise. As stated earlier, the leadership has the task of "guiding" history towards its inevitable conclusion. Therefore, "as long as the CPSU maintains its position as the single source of power in the state, positions in the military, foreign, and internal policy will be perceived against a backdrop of the Marxist-Leninist ideology." [Ref. 14: p. 34]

Furthermore, and most importantly, Marxism-Leninism would not have been accepted into the new Bolshevik state unless it brought with it some aspects of the Russian "national character." [Ref. 4: p. 32] One Soviet emigre has provided an excellent example of such characteristics in the following passage:

> The basic "laws" of [the] Marxist dialectic can be detected in the patterns of thinking of most Soviet people, even those who are radical opponents of Communism. . . . it becomes clear that although people of Soviet mentality reject the notion of class struggle as the main driving force behind all social changes, they do perceive the world as divided into two opposite poles which are in constant conflict, the energy emanating from which drives the process of change; this is essentially the number one "law" of [the] Marxist dialectic. [Ref. 15]

With these thoughts in mind it is necessary to review those aspects of the Russian "national character" which play a role in the Soviet officer's actions. The inter-

relationship of these factors with Marxism-Leninism provides a remarkable influence over Soviet thoughts and decisions.

III. CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCES

A. RUSSIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

> Russia is to the Soviet Union as a man is to the disease afflicting him. . . . the word Russia can serve only to designate an oppressed people denied the possibility of acting as one entity or to denote its suppressed national consciousness, religion, and culture. Or else it can point to a future nation liberated from Communism.
>
> Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "The Mortal Danger."

Before reviewing the combined influences of the "Russian" tradition and the "Soviet" ideology, one must understand the difference between Russia and the Soviet Union. Although such a clarification may seem quite elementary, most Americans still refer to the Soviet Union as Russia and consequently make no distinction between Russians and any other nationality within the USSR. This lack of distinction was even widespread in American academic literature on the Soviet Union until the 1960s and is occasionally present today.

The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics is just that: a union of fifteen republics. These include the Byelorussian (White Russian), Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Azerbaidzhan, Georgian, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The latter of these is by far

the largest republic and that which is commonly known as Rossiya (Russia). As mentioned previously, ethnic Russians comprise the majority of the USSR's population (although their percentage is decreasing), and Russian is the official language of the Soviet Union. Russians also hold a vast majority of the elite governmental positions, which has resulted in the "Russification" of the Soviet Union. That is, a program of emphasis on the Russian culture and language in a collectivization process. When drafted into the military, for example, the various ethnic groups are sent far away from their own cultures. When local traditions are tolerated (which is very much the case in Georgia and increasingly so in the Baltic republics), they still must not challenge Moscow or the ideology. [Ref. 16: p. 68]

Next, the proper definition of a Soviet must be addressed. The Russian word soviet literally means council, although Americans do not translate it as such into English. In one respect, a Soviet is any citizen of the USSR, regardless of nationality. On the other hand, a Soviet must not be mistaken for a Russian when discussed in the context of a governmental or military role. For example, a Soviet officer may be Russian, but Russian officers and armed forces do not exist. When patriotism is required, however, the Soviets call upon the Russian national character. "It was not for the slogans of Marx and Lenin that the Russian

people fought so bravely [during World War II], but for their 'Motherland'." [Ref. 16: p. 65]

B. THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER

While the Marxist-Leninist ideology affects all aspects of Soviet life, the influence of Russian history cannot be underestimated when addressing Soviet thoughts and values. The following description of the development of the Russian national character since the thirteenth century will reveal attitudes and preconceptions which bear a striking resemblance to those inherent in the twentieth-century Soviet Union.

The key word to understanding Russian tradition and its role in the Soviet Union is survival. The Russians are a people who have "witnessed frequent wars, foreign invasions, bloody governmental repression, and domestic upheavals" throughout their existence [Ref. 16: p. 65]. The terrain provides Moscow with no protective barriers, and the plains are easily crossed, resulting in conflict upon conflict in and around Mother Russia. Nevertheless, the Russians have survived and expanded their borders outward from the homeland. They have turned survival into an art, a necessary pursuit in a world of enemies. The resulting obsession with security and secretiveness at any cost is often perceived in the West as a paranoia. A more accurate

observation would be the unavoidable development of a "fortress" mentality in the interests of survival. [Ref. 16]

1. The Peasant Class

By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a peasant class had developed around a village culture. This society revolved around an autocratic organization of "elders," leaders who were not chosen but who emerged. Among them was a front man who became the conveyer for the collective. No one asked about the elders or village structure because those who needed to know were informed, and those who asked were punished or executed. This culture was never officially institutionalized and yet remained intact until the Stalinist purges of the 1930s and 1940s. It was a secret society in which the elders decided everything. There was no individualism, as unanimity was demanded and cruelty was the consequence. Without the collective an individual could not survive. Likewise, the village took no risks in its own survival and thus rejected any innovation or change. Many Soviet leaders, including Gorbachev, have emerged from this culture. [Ref. 17]

2. The Princely Court

The emergence of the Princely Court resulted in a political separation of this class and the peasants. The problem for both, however, remained survival. The Grand Prince of Moscow absorbed all the neighboring principalities. He deprived his potential rivals of their

independent bases of political and economic power by making them servators of his court. Nobles were members of family clans, each of which had a leader; but the Tsar kept reigns on all the clans as they constantly orbited around him. The state was the prize of the government, vice the opposite.

This emerging concept of centralized leadership prevented chaos in the system. Chaos in the Russian culture represents risk and thus threatens survival of the collective. Imposing one's will through total domination and control preserves order in the system and is basic to the Russian mentality. This system, like the peasant class, existed until the early twentieth century. In order to operate, however, it depended on a staff which eventually emerged into a Serving Class, or bureaucracy. [Ref. 17]

3. The Serving Class

This class included the church, military, police, and government staff. There was no political power here. Importance was according to function vice status, and by the mid-nineteenth century changes began to occur rapidly in Imperial Russia.

In September 1812 Napoleon occupied Moscow, which was subsequently burned by the Russians themselves in an attempt to make it untenable for the foreign armies. Within five weeks Napoleon was unable to call a truce with the Tsar (or to maintain his troops away from France) and thus retreated. By March 1814, the Allies in turn occupied

Paris. While in Paris, Russian officers were able to learn more about western liberalism. These officers later began forming opposition to the Tsar through secret societies.

After the death of Tsar Alexander I in 1825, the "Northern Society" (which favored a constitutional monarchy and the abolition of serfdom) staged the ill-fated "Decembrist Revolution." Tsar Nicholas I was able to immediately supress the uprising. Although he saw the need for reforms, Nicholas was vehemently opposed to such independent public activity. He imposed measures of censorship and control of education and used secret police in a move towards the repression of liberalism. Opposition to his bureaucratic rule, however, continued and was able to gain influence as Russia suffered defeats in the Crimean War.

Alexander II became Tsar in 1855 and began to implement reforms including liberation of the serfs and a system of self-government. The liberals, however, demanded more, and the political culture was unable to keep pace with the reforms. Internal unrest grew over several decades until Lenin siezed power in the midst of chaos in 1917. The Soviet state was born. [Ref. 10: pp. 749-56]

While this encapsulation does not presume to provide an adequate review of Russian history, it does indicate that collectivization, centralized control, risk-

avoidance, secretiveness, and mistrust are not exclusively Communist characteristics but deeply Russian as well.

C. THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN MENTALITIES

For a better understanding of the Soviet officer's preconceptions in the field of military affairs, one must realize how the previously mentioned cultural factors and their relation to the ideology influence his values. Examples of contrast with American cultural influences will further emphasize the radical differences between the two.

Perhaps the most useful source in understanding general cultural influences and differences is Edward Hall's Beyond Culture [Ref. 18]. Hall's book provides an invaluable awareness of that which most Americans take for granted. His argument is as follows:

> The cultural and psychological insight that is important for us to accept is that denying culture and obscuring the effects that it can have on human talents can be as destructive and potentially dangerous as denying evil. [Ref. 18: p. 7]

Hall explains the delineation between what he terms "high context" and "low context" cultures (with the explanation that neither is better nor worse than the other). High context cultures are characterized by a conceptual outlook on the world and life. Everything is based on a "big picture," and conformity is the rule. The USSR is a high context culture. Low context cultures are very individualistic and stress details rather than concepts.

They emphasize paired opposites of "either/or" without accounting for an alternative. The U.S. is a low context culture. Hall awakens his readers to actions that are often considered human nature but are actually products of cultural influence. His book should be required reading for any military personnel who encounter foreign cultures, whether it be in battle or simply stationing overseas.

1. Contrasting Mentalities

In evaluating the Soviet officer and his preconceptions, it becomes apparent that his actions are indeed products of culture. This culture includes a mixture of such concepts as the Russian political tradition, the Russian national character, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Communist ideology, and even geography in comprising what may be termed "The Soviet Mentality." [Ref. 19: pp. 2-4]

In both the U.S. and USSR the process of socialization and, thus, the understanding of mentality can be seen through "channels of influence" which shape the lives and values of their citizens. In the United States, these are the family, school, church, mass media, and the "street." (The last being all unorganized influences such as peers, neighbors, strangers, etc.) Soviet channels of influence, however, do not include the church or the mass media as separate entities. These have been absorbed into the "school" channel, which actually includes all official organizations and is the channel through which the Party

promotes ideology. For example, the church is tolerated "to the extent that Christian ethics coincide with official Communist ethics, a phenomenon which is not very extensive." Furthermore, censorship has prevented the mass media from developing in the Soviet Union as it has in the United States. The media exists primarily as a propaganda tool and, like other official institutions, must reflect the ideology. Therefore, it too can be included in the "school." This official channel competes with the family and street influences, resulting in Soviet citizens learning to live two lives: one with those they can trust, and one with those they cannot trust. [Ref. 19: pp. 19-22]

These influences are in constant conflict and result in an almost schizophrenic suspicion and internal mistrust among the people, as well as a xenophobic fear. "Trust requires taking risks; the Russians prefer suspicion, which averts risks, in its stead." [Ref. 20: p. 134] This conflict supports the tenets of the Marxist-Leninist dialectic and produces a precise understanding of who one's "enemies" are. Americans, on the other hand, "have difficulty perceiving someone as a permanent or mortal enemy. The concept of an indefinite struggle is completely alien to him." Furthermore, because of the American's distaste for confrontation, he "perceives compromise as the essence of a deal" and is receptive to any expression of friendliness. "For him, a concession is a manifestation of

self-confidence and good-will, not a bribe intended to ensure good treatment [as it is from a Soviet perspective]." [Ref. 19: pp. 44-45]

Another important value shaped by channels of influence in both societies is the notion of truth. In the United States, suppression or alteration of the truth is seen in a negative aspect. For Americans, censorship and propaganda represent such suppression and alteration and are unacceptable. In the Soviet Union, however, propaganda is an "idealized truth" and has no negative connotation. Truth is revealed through the ideology and the CPSU. [Ref. 7: p. 2] As they are seldom exposed to information opposing the Party line, Soviet citizens have developed a unique style of both reading and writing to filter official censorship [Ref. 16: p. 66].

Finally, the concept of time is important in evaluating the Soviet and American mentalities. As already stated, Marxism-Leninism has no timetable by which Capitalism must be defeated. This concept is apparent in Soviet daily life as well. Soviets tend to live in the past and the future. In this respect, they are "surviving" the present. They view life in terms of what will be achieved but are in no hurry. The inevitable will eventually come about.

Americans, on the other hand, see the "American Dream" as being available today and thus live in the

present. They expect rapid changes in life and prepare very little for the future. They are also less aware of the relevance of the historical past. The goal is to achieve something and move on. Americans seem obsessed with saving time in hopes that more might be accomplished and are rarely willing to be patient in achieving long term goals. This notion is prevalent in the U.S. political system and even military officer rotations, where changes occur every few years. Some analysts have noted that the Soviets understand this American trait and perceive the U.S. as quick to make concessions in the search for a deal. [Ref. 7: p. 17]

To continue presenting the differences between American and Soviet cultural influences could be endless. At this point the necessity of evaluating the enemy from his own perspective should be apparent. The following passage provides a summation of the contrasting mentalities:

> From the American point of view . . . such traits as having double standards, not living in the present, blaming the system for personal failures, suspiciousness, and so on, are symptoms of schizoid disorders and criteria which we associate with a loser.
>
> From the Soviet point of view, however, suspiciousness is a sign of psychological maturity; blaming the system is a sign of political maturity; the ability to discriminate friends from enemies is a sign of intellectual maturity. . . . some qualities of American mentality look like signs of emotional and intellectual immaturity, selfishness, social coldness, and so on. [Ref. 19: p. 50]

2. The Military Mentality

From the understanding of these differences in mentality it will be useful to apply a simple example from

the military to develop the necessity of proper perception even further. In the United States, service to the country results from a "manifestation of affection" rather than a duty [Ref. 19: p. 45]. In the Soviet conscriptive system, however, service is a duty to defend the homeland, a matter of honor and conscience [Ref. 21: p. 9].

Interestingly, these differences in the mindsets of Soviet and U.S. military officers are evident even in the content of their respective oaths of office. It is important to note in this comparison that both Soviet officers and enlisted personnel take the same oath, reflecting the ideological concept of a classless society. The respective Soviet and U.S. oaths are as follows:

The Oath of Allegiance

> I, citizen of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, joining the ranks of the Armed Forces, take the oath and solemnly pledge to be a conscientious, brave, disciplined and vigilant warrior, strictly to observe military and state secrets, to observe the constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws, unquestioningly to carry out the requirements of all military regulations and orders of commanders and superiors.
>
> I pledge conscientiously to study military science, to preserve in every way military and public property and to remain devoted till my last breath to my people, my Soviet homeland and the Soviet government.
>
> I am prepared at all times, on orders from the Soviet government to come out in defense of my homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I pledge to defend it courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honour, without sparing my blood and life in securing complete victory over the enemies.

If I break this solemn vow, may I be severely punished by the Soviet people, universally hated, and despised by the working people. [Ref. 21]

The Oath of Office

I, [name], having been appointed [rank] in the [appropriate service] under the conditions indicated in this document, do accept such appointment and do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God. [Ref. 22]

The differences in these documents reflect the differences of the men who take them, as well as the societies which administer them. While much time could be spent evaluating the semantics of these oaths, the more important differences lie in their themes.

The Soviet oath is much more elaborate in its delineation of required qualities of a military servicemember, his actions in "defense of the homeland," and actions to be taken against him if he fails. It calls for his carrying out the orders of superiors (also included in the U.S. military enlisted oath) and the securing of complete victory over enemies. This reflects the very nature of the Soviet mentality with the need to be part of a collective rather than an individual. The oath is considered a "vow to the people, the Party and Lenin, leader of the revolution, to fight heroically for the righteous cause of the workers and peasants." [Ref. 21: p. 9]

The U.S. Oath of Office is, however, almost legalistic in nature and much more general in its rhetoric. It leaves much room for individualism by not defining the traits required of a good servicemember. Furthermore, this oath is taken by all elected or appointed officials in an office of "honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services" of the U.S. government [Ref. 23]. The rhetoric of the U.S. oath reaffirms the Soviet perception of the U.S. Armed Forces as mercenary and based on subordination of the working class. In Soviet terms, the Oath of Allegiance merely establishes the requirements under which the Soviet citizen will execute his responsibility to defend the homeland.

D. THE SOVIET MILITARY EXPERIENCE

A final influence which must be reviewed in understanding Soviet thoughts, decisions, and actions is the Soviet military experience, particularly that of World War II. As already discussed, the Russian and Soviet experiences of war have been many and have resulted in the development of a fortress mentality. These experiences have "made them strangely blind to such contradictory actions as the deployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles facing Western Europe while professing their 'peace-loving' intentions." [Ref. 16: pp. 65-66] The United States, on the other hand, has enjoyed the luxury of geographic isolation and, thus, a

military tradition which perceives the defense of American interests (vice territory) as the primary objective.

In understanding the Soviet military experience and the concept of "defense of the homeland," a most sobering perspective for an American is to realize the losses taken by the Soviet Union during World War II. The USSR lost 10 percent (usually quoted at around twenty million lives) of its population during that war. This was in addition to the deliberate collectivization and famine and political purges carried out by Stalin before the war. These accounted for several million more deaths. In fact, three of Stalin's five senior military officers were themselves executed. Such executions resulted in junior officers rapidly assuming command positions. For example, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov, achieved flag rank at the age of thirty-one and was appointed Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy at forty-five (in 1956), where he served until 1985. The devastation of this period has never been equaled in the U.S. and is thus incomprehensible in American society. Furthermore, the effects of losing more than a generation of the male population is not likely to stop affecting the USSR for several decades to come. To put this in a more vivid perspective, the Soviet Union lost more men in the siege of Leningrad alone than the United States has lost in every battle since the American Revolution

[Ref. 24: p. 36]! In fact, it is difficult to find a Soviet citizen over the age of fifty who

> has not killed someone, who was not wounded himself, who was not a prisoner or a prison guard, who did not suffer starvation or did not see peasants dead of starvation . . . who did not deport peasants to Siberia or did not lose all his property himself. [Ref. 19: p. 38]

The next step in understanding the Soviet from his own perspective is to study how institutional factors influence his thoughts and actions. An introduction to the Soviet serviceman's training and education, combined with applications of leadership and initiative, will further reveal the vast differences between the Soviet and American mentalities.

IV. THE SOVIET SERVICEMAN

> A serviceman in the Armed Forces of the USSR is a defender of his motherland--the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.
>
> A serviceman must observe the laws sacredly and be true to the military oath; must be disciplined, honest, just and brave, and must spare no resources, not even life itself, in the fulfillment of his military duty; he must obey his commanders implicitly and defend them in battle; and guard his unit's banner as the cherished symbol that it is.
>
> Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR

While even the Soviets admit that there are problems of apathy among young conscripts and difficulty in instilling the sense of duty mentioned above, the effects of military service (like the ideology) cannot be escaped. The armed forces are viewed as "one" with the Soviet citizens. They are "not just a school of military expertise, but also a school of ideological and physical conditioning, discipline and organization." [Ref. 25: p. 102] This view of the armed forces reemphasizes the concept of a collective throughout society, the development of a "soldier-citizen." The conscriptive system gives all young Soviet men (with very few exceptions) a common frame of reference for the rest of their lives. Furthermore, all Soviet children are indoctrinated in military affairs through youth organizations, paramilitary groups, textbooks, and even sports.

The Appendix provides a concise overview of military indoctrination and service. The following review of Soviet military pedagogy will address some specifics of indoctrination, training, and education, emphasizing the differences between U.S. and Soviet military service. A more thorough examination of Soviet manpower, training, and mobilization can be found in Harriet and William Scott's[1] book, The Armed Forces of the USSR [Ref. 26]. This work is perhaps the definitive Western source on Soviet military affairs and is required reading for any student of Soviet studies.

A. INDOCTRINATION, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION

These elements of Soviet military service are included in the field of military pedagogy, which is defined as

> the science of communist education, training and indoctrination of Soviet soldiers and of the preparation of subunits and units (or ships) for successful operation under the conditions of modern warfare. [Ref. 27: p. 7]

Military pedagogy is considered a component part of "military science" (to be presented in Chapter V), which provides it with a "theoretical military foundation." As with all else in Soviet military affairs, however, the

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[1]Colonel William F. Scott, USAF (Ret.), served in Moscow as Senior Air Attache (1962-64) and later as Defense and Air Attache (1970-72). Harriet Fast Scott is a consultant on Soviet military affairs and a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. They maintain the largest private library of Soviet military publications in the United States.

"methodological foundation" of military pedagogy is provided by the "Marxist-Leninist philosophy--dialectical and historical materialism." [Ref. 27: p. 12]

Despite their ideological foundation, the roles of indoctrination, training, and education in the Soviet military are not unlike those in the U.S. Indoctrination is considered a process of influencing a serviceman's "consciousness, feeling, and will" by instilling in them "conviction, moral traits, behavioral patterns, and skills" that are relative to their particular branch of the armed forces. Training provides specific "scientific knowledge, skills, and abilities" for performing their duties. Finally, education "presupposes a certain level of preparedness" and can provide a general knowledge of principles or specific knowledge for a certain level of qualification. The primary differences between these Soviet and their corresponding U.S. concepts lie in their content and manner of application. [Ref. 27: pp. 8-9]

In the Soviet Union, the military permeates all aspects of life. In addition to the ever-present war memorials, slogans, and banners, the following factors represent just a few of the influences of military affairs over society:

* Army garrison commanders automatically hold office in the administrative councils of garrison towns.

* The military industries take priority over civilian concerns in economic life.

* The military medical services constitute the senior branch of the Soviet national health system.

* The army is used on a large scale every year to help in the harvest.

* Large-scale military exercises and parades bring the military into the public eye.

* A great deal of railway, pipe line, and industrial construction is performed by military engineering units.

* Weekly television programs on basic military training ("I Serve the Soviet Union") are shown throughout the country.

* War memorials and museums are guarded by military or Komsomol guards.

* Even the newly wedded bride is expected to lay her bridal wreath on the local memorial of the unknown soldier. [Ref. 28: pp. 15-16]

This continuous military presence affects the Soviet youth as well. As discussed previously, the school and family influences have a lasting effect on Soviet children. The potential of these forces in developing patriotic fervor is not hidden but encouraged in Soviet writings.

> Patriots are not born. They are molded. They are forged by the Soviet way of life, the family and school, our social organization, labor and troop collectives, and the entire system for ideological-political, labor, and moral indoctrination. [Ref. 29]

1. Indoctrination of Youth

Organized military indoctrination of Soviet youth begins in school. Russian language textbooks include readings on Soviet missiles and the strength of the Soviet Army. One textbook, entitled Rusky Yazyk u kartinkakh [Russian Language in Drawings], asks seven year old children

what they would like to be when they grow up. The possible answers include five illustration of "a tank commander, a jet fighter pilot, an armed marine, a frontier guard and a man sitting behind the panel ready to press the buttons for the missiles to be fired." [Ref. 30: p. 68] School physical education programs are called "Ready for Labor and Defense" (GTO), and include such activities as grenade throwing, cross-country skiing, and marksmanship. In 1977, over one million children received marksmanship ratings [Ref. 31: pp. 607-8].

Furthermore, children are expected to join one of the three Soviet youth groups: The Little Octobrists, Young Pioneers, or Komsomol (see Appendix). Americans sometimes equate these organizations to the Boy and Girl Scouts of America and the Explorers program. This comparison is inaccurate because these Soviet organizations (primarily the Komsomol) are considered a major step towards higher education and Communist Party membership. They are also another avenue for military indoctrination. The Young Pioneers handbook, Tovarishch [Comrade], contains an attractive section on the Soviet Armed Forces, including pictures of equipment, military ranks and insignias, as well as descriptions of the various branches of service [Ref. 26: p. 331].

An additional institutional influence is the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation,

and the Fleet (DOSAAF), which provides pre-draft training to youths at least 14 years of age. A primary purpose of DOSAAF is to train future draftees in their prospective military specialties. DOSAAF operates airfields, sports complexes, and a publishing house. The organization also provides its services to the civilian population to improve the quality of Soviet workers. [Ref. 28: pp. 326-28]

Yet another method of preparing youth for military service is provided through military-sports games. Two such games exist on a national level. Zarnitsa [Lightning] is for third through eighth grade students and reportedly involves twenty million students annually. The second game, Orlenok [Eaglet], is intended for those from 16 to 19 years of age and involves nine million youths a year. Events include mapping, marches, tactics, anti-tank and anti-helicopter defense, and first aid to name a few. [Ref. 31: p. 608]

The result of these various methods of paramilitary and pre-draft training is that when a young man begins his basic training and subsequent conscription, he is already indoctrinated and at least fundamentally trained for his military duties. More importantly, he is a soldier-citizen, a member of the collective who is better able to uphold the ideology. Whether or not he is enthusiastic about his service, he cannot escape the influence it will have on the remainder of his life.

2. Training and Education of Officers

The training and education of Soviet officers is also quite different from that experienced in the United States. The USSR maintains approximately 140 military and higher military schools from which 50,000 active duty officers are commissioned annually. Most of these schools include four or five year curricula and confer degrees roughly equivalent to a bachelor's degree. This is remarkably different from the U.S. system where only a few thousand officers graduate annually from the service academies, while the majority receive their commissions through respective Officer Candidate programs and Reserve Officers Training Corps. Another distinction is the specialization of the Soviet military schools. Each service maintains schools for particular specialties in addition to those which prepare line officers. Examples include tank, navigation, engineering, radioelectronics and construction schools. Again, these are full-length, academically rigorous commissioning programs which confer degrees, not short training courses which are attended after commissioning. [Ref. 26: pp. 348-70]

The Soviet military also maintains seventeen "military academies" which are comparable to U.S. service schools, staff, and war colleges. These schools are usually attended by officers in their late twenties or early thirties (with the exception of the more senior Voroshilov

General Staff Academy). Attendance is a prerequisite for advancement to command positions. The difference between these schools and their U.S. equivalents is again their duration. Courses at the Soviet military academies are three to five years long, while those at U.S. staff and war colleges are usually less than a year (and very often only a few weeks) in duration. [Ref. 26: p. 370-87]

Graduate degrees in a variety of disciplines are also available to Soviet officers. These include the unique degrees of Candidate and Doctor of Military Science. While the U.S. military maintains graduate schools and also sends officers to civilian institutions, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas only began offering the degree of Master of Military Art and Sciences in 1974.[2] Today it remains the only U.S. military institution to confer such a degree.

The result of the Soviet officer's military indoctrination, training, and education is a specialization that does not exist in the United States. While this has both advantages and disadvantages, it provides the Soviet with a much different attitude towards his military duties than that of his American counterpart. An understanding of this difference alone is helpful in evaluating the Soviet from his own perspective. One aspect of that perspective

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[2]This degree was then retroactively conferred to graduates from as early as 1964.

which is not only influenced but shaped by an officer's higher education is his concept of leadership and initiative. The Soviet's style of leadership and initiative is central to his thoughts, decisions, and actions.

B. LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE

In the United States, the concept of a "born-leader" holds a positive connotation and sense of respect because leadership is often considered an intrinsic element of one's personality, not a quality which can be taught. Leaders naturally rise to positions of authority and responsibility as a result of their inherent abilities, not their learned skills.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, a leader is developed through extensive training and a firm knowledge of the ideology.

> Marxist-Leninist training for officer personnel is the basis for the successful shaping of commanders. This is because political maturity and ideological conviction predetermine the commander's other moral qualities and fighting efficiency and his will for victory. [Ref. 32]

Thus, "born-leaders" do not exist in the USSR. Leadership qualities such as initiative are not individual responses but are developed traits based on combat studies [Ref. 33: p. 21]. Constant education is considered the only method of attaining the attributes necessary for successful leadership.

> There exists only one path to the full possession of these qualities and to the preparedness for accomplishing the responsible and complex tasks of Armed Forces service--to firmly remember and sacredly fulfill V. I. Lenin's behest of learning military affairs in a real way. Learn always and everywhere. . . . [Ref. 25: p. 190]

This concept sheds light on the importance and strong influence of a serviceman's lifelong indoctrination and training. From an American perspective, this notion of learning to be a leader seems only to reinforce an assumption that the Soviet commander's actions on the battlefield are strictly limited, that he is unable to use his own initiative when the course of a battle changes. Such an assumption is inaccurate because the Soviet concept of initiative does allow for a commander's independent decisions and even risk. The Soviets admit that a victorious commander supplements orders with inventiveness, intelligent initiative, and creativity [Ref. 32].

1. Soviet Initiative

The initiative of a commander is defined as

> (1) A creative, informal solution by a subordinate commander (commanding officer) during an operation (or battle), which is a part of a mission assigned to him, and the readiness to take a calculated risk in connection with such a solution. The initiative of a commanding officer (commander) consists in striving to find the best method of fulfilling the assigned mission, in utilizing favorable opportunities, and in taking the most expedient measures promptly, without awaiting orders from one's immediate superior. (2) The ability to impose one's will on the enemy in the course of an operation (or battle). [Ref. 34: p. 92]

The key phrase in this definition is "calculated risk" because such calculation preserves order in an otherwise

inherently chaotic situation. In this context, the Soviet commander may only take a risk under certain conditions and circumstances. Surprise is an essential element in this equation, as it is a method of imposing one's will (and tactics) on the enemy. Use of surprise in taking risks, however, is based on sound tactical training and knowledge of the enemy. [Ref. 35: p. 45] In this respect, a commander may take a risk and display the necessary initiative when he has a complete understanding of the situation, including both his own and the enemies capabilities, and has the skill to carry out the necessary maneuver. Most importantly, the commander who conducts proper training under a variety of possible conditions and strives to improve and perfect his tactics will be able to take such risks when unexpected circumstances arise. [Ref. 36: p. 46]

The Soviet solution to risk-taking is to minimize the effect of uncertainty (which represents a loss of control) if not prevent it altogether. This is accomplished through predvidenie [foresight] and prognozirovanie [forecasting]. These concepts are essential tools of the Soviet commander in the process of command and control and, as might be expected, hold quite different meanings from a Soviet perspective than an American one.

2. Soviet Foresight and Forecasting

In the most fundamental terms, foresight is the ability to comprehend future conditions and forecasting is

the action taken to influence those conditions. Foresight is considered possible because (according to Marxism-Leninism) nothing is unknowable, whether it be in the past, present, or future. There are only "things, phenomena, and processes that are not yet comprehended." [Ref. 37: pp. 24-25] Foresight should not be perceived as prediction because this implies "passive" acceptance of an inevitable future. Such a view eliminates the requirement for the subsequent guidance of future events (forecasting). More accurately, it is considered a weapon to be used against an enemy through action upon the objective world. [Ref. 38: pp. 1, 6] The following explanation of foresight also indicates the Soviet understanding of the importance of knowing the enemy and avoiding value-projection.

> Military foresight is possible only where there is a comprehensive study, taking into account all the elements of the situation; a profound understanding of the goals and missions of impending military operations; knowledge of, and allowance for, factors which can influence the development of events; and above all, an excellent knowledge of the enemy, and an absence of bias in assessing his activities. The ability to foresee is a necessary quality for every commanding general (or commander, staff officer). . . . [Ref. 34: p. 172]

In short, foresight allows the commander to better apply himself on the battlefield. With his firm grasp of Marxism-Leninism, extensive training and education, and the resulting development of initiative and foresight, the Soviet officer is equipped to meet and secure victory over the enemy in a future war. This is when he will apply his

knowledge of military art, which is the "theory and practice of engaging in combat, operations, and armed conflict as a whole . . . [and] is the main field of military science." [Ref. 34: p. 39] Furthermore, because of the constant qualitative transformation of weaponry in the twentieth century, military science must look to the future by utilizing foresight. This utilization will be apparent in an introduction and evaluation of the Soviet concepts of military doctrine, science, and art (and its component parts: strategy, operational art, and tactics). This review will include a comparison of equivalent U.S. concepts and hopefully provide the reader with a better understanding of Soviet military thought.

V. SOVIET VERSUS U.S. MILITARY CONCEPTS

This chapter will be an introduction to the Soviet concepts of military doctrine, science, and art, including military strategy, operational art, and tactics. These concepts are at the foundation of a Soviet officer's training and education and serve as his necessary "tools" for encountering the enemy. This presentation will be limited to providing the U.S. officer with a realization of the differences (or similarities) between these Soviet concepts and their U.S. equivalents (which do not exist in every case). In the United States, military doctrine, science, and art have general meanings. Soviet applications are, on the other hand, very precise and based upon the "scientific" theory of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, to evaluate Soviet military literature without an understanding of the Soviet definitions and applications of these concepts could lead to erroneous conclusions. [Ref. 26: p. 74] More importantly, to evaluate Soviet actions in combat from an American perspective could be disastrous.

It must be understood that a complete presentation of these concepts would be infinite in scope, as these elements of military affairs represent full academic disciplines in the Soviet Union. There is no shortage of translated Soviet military literature on these subjects. The U.S. Air Force

has translated and published twenty-one such books under the Soviet Military Thought series. Harriet and William Scott give excellent coverage to each of these concepts, including their historical development, in The Armed Forces of the USSR. The Scotts have also compiled and edited The Soviet Art of War [Ref. 39], a collection of Soviet writings on doctrine, strategy, and tactics from 1917 to 1979.

A. MILITARY DOCTRINE

Soviet military theory begins with the concept of military doctrine, which has no structured counterpart in the West. The Soviets emphasize, however, that every state has its own doctrine, the content of which is "determined by the character of the social system of the state and its policy." [Ref. 25: pp. 272-73] They define it in generic terms and write often about U.S. military doctrine.

In 1985, Colonel General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and Doctor of Military Science, gave M. V. Frunze[3] credit for "establishing the principles of Soviet military

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[3]Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze is placed just after Lenin as the founder of the Red Army. He became chief of staff of the Red Army in May 1924 and relieved Leon Trotsky (actually responsible for the Army's establishment) as people's commissar for military and naval affairs in January 1925. He was placed in the hospital for minor surgery under Stalin's orders in October 1925 and mysteriously died after the operation. [Ref. 39: p. 27]

doctrine." [Ref. 40: p. 86] Frunze provided the following definition in 1921:

> A "unified military doctrine" is a teaching adopted by the army of a particular state establishing the nature of the armed forces development, the methods of troop combat training and the methods of troop management, based on the states prevailing views on the nature of the military missions lying before it and the means for executing them, which are dependent on the class nature of the state and are defined by the level to which the countries productive forces have developed. [Ref. 39: p. 29]

While the content of Soviet military doctrine has gone through several official changes in the past sixty-six years, this definition remains virtually unchanged. The latest restatement was made in 1982 by Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, then chief of the General Staff. This definition restated "the nature of the military missions lying before it" as "the nature of a possible future war." [Ref. 12] In any form, the Soviet definition of doctrine is quite different from the following U.S. definition:

> Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. [Ref. 41: p. 118]

These two definitions alone indicate that great differences exist between U.S. and Soviet perceptions of doctrine. Perhaps the best U.S. equivalent to Soviet military doctrine would be a mix between "grand strategy" and "national security policy." However, even this explanation is inadequate considering the ambiguity of a grand strategy in contemporary U.S. policy and the fact that national

security policy is inherently inconsistent and vague in a democratic political system where the leadership is re-elected every four years [Ref. 42: pp. 21-22].

In delineating the main concerns of military doctrine, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, then Soviet Minister of Defense, wrote in 1975 that military doctrine answers the following questions:

* What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
* What is the nature of the war in which the state and its armed forces will have to take part; what goals and missions might they be faced with in this war?
* What armed forces are needed to complete the assigned missions, and in what direction must military development be carried out?
* How are preparations for war to be implemented?
* What methods must be used to wage war? [Ref. 25: p. 272]

In answering these questions, doctrine ties theory to practice by pulling together political goals and the potential and capability to achieve them [Ref. 43]. Frunze explained this aspect of doctrine by noting that it consisted of two parts: the technical and the political. The technical principles of doctrine

> encompass questions of organization, training and employment of the armed forces in war, determine the major trends for combat employment, the technical equipping, and the organizational structure of the armed forces; the development of military art, and the requirements for the combat training of troops and their combat readiness. [Ref. 44: p. 406]

The political (and primary) principles, on the other hand, include

> the propositions revealing the socio-political essence of war which the imperialists can unleash upon the Soviet Union, the character of political objectives and the strategic tasks of the state in it, and their influence on the construction of the armed forces and the methods of preparing for and waging war. [Ref. 44: p. 406]

These two aspects are in dialectic unity because the Soviets consider it impossible to separate war from politics or to view the technical aspect of doctrine without its political aspect. [Ref. 40: p. 88]

The importance of this concept is that the political aspect, while having the requirement of considering military-technical capabilities, is superior to the military aspect of doctrine. This idea is in keeping with the Leninist approach, influenced by Clausewitz[4], that war is the continuation of politics by more violent means. Thus, from the Soviet perspective, the Western idea of hardware as the primary threat is flawed. Frunze even said in his Selected Works that "the decisive role is played not by equipment as behind the equipment there always is a live man, without whom the equipment is dead." [Ref. 40: p. 98]

From the understanding that Marxism-Leninism dictates doctrine in theory and that the Party is the keeper of the ideology (and doctrine) as it is practiced, one can deduce

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[4]Karl von Clausewitz was a ninteenth-century Prussian Army General whose eight-book collection, On War, contended that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." Clausewitz's writings are often considered to be relevant even today. [Ref. 45]

that the "doctrine says that the Party says what the doctrine says." [Ref. 5: p. 2] This further emphasizes the political aspect's superiority and reinforces the absolute "truth" of the ideology. This entire concept may be difficult for the U.S. officer to grasp because he has no equivalent for comparison. He must remember, however, that while the Soviet officer may not always know the precise laws of war as laid out by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, he must be able to substantiate his decisions based on an official Party pronouncement [Ref. 5: p. 2].

A final point of importance concerning military doctrine in the Soviet Union is that it applies to the armed forces as a whole. There is no separate doctrine for individual services. It is in essence a doctrine of the state which is "determined by the general conditions of a state's life and by its political and social system." [Ref. 40: p. 89]

B. MILITARY SCIENCE

The Soviet concept of military science is another without equivalence in the United States. In fact, military science is not even defined by the U.S. Department of Defense. The primary difficulty in understanding these Soviet military concepts emanates from this absence of U.S. equivalents and, consequently, a hierarchy of military thought. This does not suggest that the Soviet hierarchy is a superior system but only that the difference between the

two styles of military thought can result in frequent misinterpretation. Americans, for example, often confuse military science and strategy with what is actually doctrine. [Ref. 42: pp. 31-33]

In the Soviet Union, military doctrine and science are separate, but interdependent. Doctrine is the "political policy of the Party" and is partially based on the "theoretical data of military science," but there can be no debate in doctrine. In military science, on the other hand, there can be several points of view and diverse scientific concepts. It is from these ideas that prospective tenets are selected and then developed into doctrine. [Ref. 46: pp. 64-65]

Soviet military science is actually defined as

> . . . a unified system of knowledge about preparation for and waging of, war in the interests of the defense of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries against imperialist aggression.
>
> Armed combat, the chief ingredient of war, is therefore, the principle research subject of contemporary Soviet military science. [Ref. 46: pp. 47-48]

The components of military science are the theory of military art, the theory of training and education, the science of military history, military administration, military geography, and military technical services [Ref. 46: p. 50]. Of these, military art is the most important. Military science is also largely concerned with the laws of war and armed conflict. These concepts are of

the utmost importance in understanding Soviet perspectives on war and will be presented in Chapter VI.

Although U.S. officers may be trained on any of these subjects at the various staff colleges or postgraduate institutions, there is no program for the study of all these disciplines. Furthermore, the education of the U.S. officer is often limited to his own service. As presented earlier, degrees in Military Science are conferred in the Soviet Union at the Candidate and Doctoral levels, and emphasis has moved closer to a combined arms concept with the elimination of separate Naval Science degrees in 1979. [Ref. 26: p. 74]

Again, each area of military science is an exhaustive field of study with precise components and laws. Each of these laws is based upon the Marxist-Leninist "teachings on war and the army" and is explainable using dialectical materialism. Of primary importance to the U.S. officer is the understanding that Soviet military science is indeed a scientific discipline comparable to physics or chemistry in its application. This concept is quite unusual for an American, as military affairs are not often studied in mathematical, quantitative terms but are considered more of an art. From the American perspective war cannot be considered a science because it has no immutable laws or applied formulas [Ref. 4: p. 58]. The Soviet military scientist would reject such a perspective, believing the

exact opposite to be true. The laws of the dialectic are themselves considered immutable.

A review of the "science" of military art will better explain these differing perspectives. In the West, mention of military art invokes images of brilliant generals and born-leaders. In the Soviet Union, however, it represents the essence of military science as a "system of knowledge."

C. MILITARY ART

The concept of military art is of the utmost importance in the theme of "perceiving" the enemy because Soviet and U.S. perceptions are quite different. "The Soviets tend to see it as an applied science with immutable laws; Westerners tend to see it as an art form executed by great captains." [Ref. 47: p. 123] Before reviewing the principles of military art, one must understand the context of the English word "art" and its Russian language counterpart iskusstvo.

In a military context, iskusstvo does not translate into art and its contrast with science. On the contrary, iskusstvo is closer to the Western idea of a science than an art. In evaluating the differences between military art and military science, Gareyev presents the definition of art as "a science, knowledge applied to a matter; mastery requiring great ability." [Ref. 40: p. 107] He substantiates the interdependence of military science and art by presenting the following passages from other Soviet military authors:

> Science is the "continuation" of art; in turn art becomes the "continuation" of science. Any art is more or less "scientific," and any science is not so scientific to be able to dispense with art. . . . What is a law in science is a rule in art. [Ref. 40: p. 112]

> Military science is the theory of military affairs. But military art is the application of the knowledge of military science in armed combat, the practice of military affairs which in our age is inconceivable without a scientific basis. [Ref. 40: p. 114]

Soviet and American views on military art drift even further apart when their official definitions and principles are studied. Soviet military art is based upon the "action" of the specific laws of war and armed conflict, which are addressed by military science [Ref. 48: p. 121]. The principles of military art are indeed the "rules" for conducting armed combat. Soviet military art is officially defined as

> The theory and practice of engaging in combat, operations, and armed conflict as a whole, with the use of all the resources of the service branches and Services of the armed forces, and also support of combat activities in every regard. Military art, as a scientific theory, is the main field of military science, and includes tactics, operational art, and strategy, which constitute an organic unity and are interdependent. [Ref. 34: p. 29]

Military art is another undefined term in the U.S. military. It is generally described as "the principles and conduct of war, and consists of the two divisions of strategy and tactics (note that there is no operational art in U.S. military thought)." [Ref. 4: p. 61] It is not surprising that these differences exist, considering the societal and ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the

United States. These differences reinforce the general hypothesis that, despite ones own beliefs, the enemy must be recognized from his own perspective in order to be evaluated properly in combat. The following presentation of the principles of military art will begin with an example of non-recognition.

1. An Example of Non-Recognition

A typical example of not recognizing the enemy from his own perspective is W. K. Sanderson's essay, "The Military Arts." [Ref. 49]. Sanderson reviews the thoughts of several military theorists from throughout history in an attempt to define military art, strategy, and tactics. He comes to the conclusion that terms such as strategy and tactics should be avoided and not misused. The problem with Sanderson's conclusion is that he attempts to reduce the theory of military art and its components to one acceptable definition. He accepts "the essence of art" in Tolstoy's definition that "art is an activity by means of which one man, having experienced a feeling, intentionally transmits it to another." He further contends that "confidence" is this feeling in military art. [Ref. 49: p. 35]

Sanderson dismisses the concept of operational art as having "no place in the trichotomy of the art of war" and as a "synonym for an undertaking--and no more." [Ref. 49: p. 38] In reaching his conclusions Sanderson cites definitions from The Pocket Oxford Dictionary, The

Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, and Blackie's Compact Etymological Dictionary.

Despite Mr. Sanderson's own beliefs on military art, strategy, operational art, and tactics, there is great danger in dismissing the "scale" of a definition used by other military thinkers. There is room for operational art when dealing with an opponent who considers it a very important aspect of military affairs. To evaluate the possible strategic, operational, or tactical actions of a Soviet commander from a preconceived notion of military art as a "conveyed feeling of confidence" would be useless. Such a concept is as alien to that commander as the laws of the dialectic are to an American. Having emphasized this necessity of proper recognition, the Soviet and U.S. concepts of the components of military art can better be presented.

2. Strategy

Military strategy is the most important component of military art and is closely related, yet subordinate, to military doctrine. It is defined in Soviet military literature as encompassing "the theory and practice of preparing the country and the armed forces for war and planning and conducting war and strategic operations." [Ref. 50]

Unlike the U.S. concept of different strategies for different forces (i.e. The Maritime Strategy), Soviet

military strategy is a combined arms concept to which each service contributes. Furthermore, a strategic action is an action which can contribute to the achievement of a war's political goals, thus showing its subservience to doctrine. The tasks of Soviet military strategy are:

* Defining under the specific conditions of a war, the strategic tasks of the armed forces and the necessary resources for carrying these out.

* The elaboration and implementation of measures to prepare the armed forces, the theaters of operation as well as the nation's economy and population for the war, the planning of the war and strategic operations.

* The organization of the deployment of the armed forces and their leadership in conducting strategic-scale operations as well as studying the capabilities of the probable enemy to wage the war and strategic operations. [Ref. 51: p. 2]

The following U.S. definition of strategy is much less encompassing and more vague.

> The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. [Ref. 41: p. 346]

> [Military strategy is] the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or threat of force. [Ref. 41: p. 228]

In practice, U.S. military strategy is too often considered only in the context of strategic nuclear weapons and thus takes on a global aspect which, in reality, does not cover the entire concept of "strategic." From either a

Soviet or U.S. perspective, a weapon need not be intercontinental as a prerequisite to being strategic.

While a direct correlation between Soviet and U.S. concepts of military strategy does not exist, the concept of a "grand strategy" is close to being equivalent [Ref. 42: pp. 21-22]. This idea can be explained in the context that U.S. military strategy is a component of grand strategy, and that while generals develop the former, statesmen develop the latter [Ref. 4: p. 65].

3. Operational Art

As a component of Soviet military art, operational art holds a position between strategy and tactics that is not generally delineated in Western thought. In fact, operational art was not a recognized part of Soviet military art until about 1924 when it was included in studies at the RKKA Military Academy upon the instruction of M. V. Frunze. Gareyev marks this inclusion as a "major victory for our scientific thought. . . . [contributing to] subsequent more profound and thorough elaboration of the methods for preparing and conducting operations." [Ref. 40: pp. 154-55] Operational art is defined as

> the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting combined and independent operations by major field forces or major formations of the Services. . . . Stemming from strategic requirements, operational art determines methods of preparing for and conducting operations to achieve strategic goals, and gives it the initial data for tactics. . . . [Furthermore] each service has its own operational art. [Ref. 34: p. 143]

The rationale for developing operational art as an intermediate stage between strategy and tactics during the 1920s was emergence of the need for "mass armies" to secure victory. While strategy and tactics were considered sufficient when one or two engagements were the decisive elements, the expansion of war during World War I saw the "rise of the operation as an aggregate of battles and engagements unified by a single overall plan but broken in space and time." [Ref. 40: p. 154]

This justification is a model example of dialectic thought in military affairs, as the law of transformation of quantity into quality is applied. The quantitative increase in the number of battles required to decide the outcome of war resulted in the qualitative jump to a new theory of military art which included operational art as a separate, yet interdependent theory.

While this emphasizes the scope of Marxism-Leninism in all aspects of Soviet military thought, it is important to note that the Soviets also make the mistake of relying on their own preconceptions in evaluating the West. Gareyev, for example, makes this mistake in evaluating Western views on operational art. He first criticizes the "bourgeois" concept of military art for splitting preparation for the operation between strategy and tactics. His explanation for the flaw in this concept is that the "separation of the same subject of research between two different theories of

military art cannot be considered scientifically sound, as it does not reflect the objective nature of modern combat." [Ref. 40: p. 156]

Gareyev continues by stating that the "bourgeois military theorists" are beginning to understand this flaw in their thought. He cites a 1982 National Defense article which notes the appearance of operational art in the doctrine of an "air-land operation" and mentions that "operational art is beginning to appear in official NATO documents." He then states that the bourgeois armies have (after criticizing Soviet military thought) apparently accepted the existence of operational art. [Ref. 40: p. 156]

Gareyev has made the same error as Sanderson in failing to recognize the legitimacy of other modes of military thought. Just as a Soviet commander would not consider Sanderson's idea of military art as a "feeling conveyed," neither would a U.S. commander take account for a "scientifically sound" method of preparing for the conduct of an operation. Neither theory is incorrect but simply based on different preconceptions which are derived from the values of the respective societies which require the existence of armed forces. To understand these differences in evaluating the enemy is to understand the enemy.

4. Tactics

The final and subordinate element of military art is tactics. Unlike other components of military art, Soviet

military tactics are quite similar in scope to those in the U.S. Armed Forces. Soviet military tactics is defined as

> the theoretical and practical aspects of preparation for the conduct of combat by subunits, units, and formations of the various services of the Armed Forces, the combat arms, and the combat service support troops. It is subdivided into general tactics and the respective tactics of the Armed Forces. . . . [Ref. 35: p. 3]

As in the U.S., each service's tactics can be further reduced to branch tactics within a particular service (i.e. fighter tactics and bomber tactics within the Air Forces) [Ref. 26: p. 75]. Like all other elements of military affairs, tactics consists of two aspects: the practical and the theoretical. In this context, the theoretical aspect is reflected in textbooks, manuals, and regulations. The practical aspect is simply the application of theory, the activities of commanders, decisionmaking, and combat itself. [Ref. 35: p. 4]

Tactics is also considered the most dynamic principle of military art, changing constantly with the acceleration of technical progress. For this reason, combat readiness, morale, and training are considered the deciding factors in victory. The quality of troops must keep up with the changes in weaponry if they are to remain effective.

This section has provided a basic understanding of Soviet military thought in the context of its marked difference from American military thought. Military doctrine and its subordinate components have undergone

important transformations in content since the Bolshevik regime took power, and especially since the end of World War II. Again, the Scotts give excellent coverage to these topics. Theoretically, however, the concepts of Soviet military thought have remained the same in form and scope since Frunze's establishment of the "Unified Military Doctrine."

With the fundamentals of military thought in mind, Soviet and U.S. concepts of war may be presented. In this section it will become apparent that the U.S. and USSR have quite different views on warfare. Americans find it difficult to understand the Soviet hierarchical structure of military thought and the concept of "immutable" laws of warfare. Likewise, the Soviets are puzzled by American attitudes. They see no structure, let alone truth, in the "mysticism" of U.S. concepts. Because of the overabundance of public information flowing from the U.S. (much of which is contradictory), the USSR often has difficulty in determining what is doctrine and what is debate.

VI. SOVIET VERSUS U.S. CONCEPTS OF WAR

> As we know, Soviet military doctrine has a defensive orientation. We do not need war. The Soviet Union and its armed forces have no intention of attacking anyone. But were aggression against us to become fact, the Soviet armed forces would respond to the need for conducting decisive actions until the total defeat of the aggressor.
>
> Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army

Such statements riddle Soviet military literature and denote a prevalent attitude concerning the defensive nature of their armed forces. Their primary military objective is professed to be "defense of the homeland." This contradicts the American perception of a "Soviet threat" (which the Soviets frequently denounce as completely unfounded) and the expansionist nature of the USSR. Consequently, this statement (like so many others) seems only to be false propaganda in an attempt to legitimize the Communist regime.

On the other hand, this statement would support the beliefs of those who tend to "mirror-image" American values in analyzing Soviet intentions. One could substitute the "United States" for the "Soviet Union" in this quote because Americans also consider themselves defensive. They do not need war and have no intention of attacking anyone unless it were in response to aggression. The fundamental belief in such value-projection is that neither nation wants to destroy the world through all-out nuclear war, that

"mutually assured destruction" (MAD) is a deterrent in itself. Herein lies the continued problem of "threat perception." Nowhere is such misperception more prevalent and proper evaluation of the enemy more important than in evaluations of Soviet and American thoughts on war.

The ideological, cultural, and institutional factors discussed to this point have a tremendous influence on both U.S. and Soviet attitudes towards war. The experiences of war have historically been external to U.S. pursuits but internal to Soviet/Russian existence. Consequently, there is a tendency to trivialize Soviet intent while ignoring important rhetoric of dangerous consequence. Likewise, the Soviet Union "maximizes the danger and exaggerates the hostility." [Ref. 24: p. 38] The resulting misperceptions make it difficult for the

> Soviets to believe that imperialism does not reciprocate their institutionalized hate, and for Americans to understand that the violence with which Soviet leaders speak may be objectively translated into military doctrine and hardware. [Ref. 24: p. 38]

In order to avoid such misunderstandings, the U.S. officer must review several factors. First, it will be necessary to understand Soviet attitudes towards the nature, types, and laws of war as embodied in the teachings of "Marxist-Leninist Theory on War and the Army." This will be followed by a review of American warfighting attitudes and the differences between U.S. and Soviet definitions of "peaceful coexistence" and "detente," as well as the current

policies of glasnost and perestroyka. It would be impossible to evaluate Soviet actions properly without a well-founded knowledge of these concepts, as value-projection is avoidable only through such an understanding.

A. MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY ON WAR AND THE ARMY

This field of study is considered a component of dialectical materialism and that element of the ideology which addresses the nature, development, and content of war. It is, more importantly, an

> ideological weapon for unmasking the reactionary military ideology of imperialism, for the struggle against various bourgeois theories which justify wars and distort their political and class nature and origin in the interests of the exploiting classes. [Ref. 46: p. 39]

The "theory on war and the army" provides the foundation for developing military science and formulating military doctrine. This supports the superiority of doctrine's political principles because war was defined by Lenin (who borrowed from Clausewitz) as the "continuation of politics of classes and states by violent means." In this respect, the essence of war has two hierarchical elements: politics and armed conflict. Politics determines the nature and character of a war, and armed conflict begins when "aggressive policies engender a military conflict . . . when other political forces are unable to prevent such a conflict." [Ref. 52: p. 24]

1. Causes and Types of War

According to the ideology, the causes of war lie in the economic foundations of antagonistic societies. The primary antagonists are of course the imperialists, led by the United States. The imperialist socio-economic system is considered to have the following irreconcilable conflicts:

> . . . competition among the monopolies and the world's leading imperialist centers, periodically repeated economic, energy, currency and financial crises, and the intensification of conflicts between labor and capital, between industrially developed capitalist states and the developing nations. [Ref. 53]

These conflicts resolve themselves in a political struggle between classes. Imperialistic policies further compress them into the socio-economic system and, consequently, generate war and armed conflict [Ref. 53]. This scenario emphasizes the Soviet perception of war's economic foundations and will be even more relevant when the types of war are reviewed because these antagonistic conflicts produce "unjust" wars.

Because of war's antagonistic essence, the Soviets believe that it is alien to the nature of Socialism and cannot occur between two Socialist states. As such, they recognize only four types of war: war between states of opposite social systems, wars of national liberation, civil wars, and wars between imperialist states [Ref. 26: pp. 66-77]. These types of war are then separated

into two categories of "just" (progressive) and "unjust" (reactionary).

Just wars are those which defend the proletariat against aggression or reactionary forces and thus "promote historical development." [Ref. 46: p. 42] The Soviets list the following as just wars:

* Wars in defense of Socialist countries against imperialist aggressors.
* Proletarian civil wars against the bourgeoisie.
* National liberation wars of colonial peoples, dependent, and developing countries against imperialism.
* Wars of liberation waged by peoples of bourgeois countries who have become the victims of imperialist invaders and who are fighting for their state sovereignty. [Ref. 46: p. 42]

Of these, any war which consolidates and develops Socialism and Communism is considered the most just. Through these distinctions one can already recognize a contradiction with the opening epigraph on page 75. While the Soviets profess not to need war or to have any intention of starting one, they are fully justified in doing so if it will guide history towards the realization of Communism. The political nature of war allows the Soviets to actually initiate the armed conflict if other political means (i.e. peaceful coexistence) have failed. This is a prime example of the Marxist-Leninist ideology being able to address a subject in any necessary context.

Unjust wars are those which support the politics of imperialism. They represent the U.S. goal (as perceived by the Soviets) to achieve world domination. Specifically, unjust wars include:

* Counter-revolutionary wars waged by the bourgeoisie against the proletarian revolutionary movement.
* Aggressive wars of imperialist states against Socialist countries.
* Imperialist wars for the restoration of the colonial system.
* Imperialist wars of conquest against peaceful bourgeois countries.
* Wars between imperialist states aimed at achieving a redistribution of spheres of influence and world domination. [Ref. 46: pp. 47-48]

From these perspectives the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is seen as completely just because the regime in Kabul is considered progressive and Soviet troops are simply carrying out their international duties. In fact, Marshal Grechko modified doctrine in 1974 to reflect this more "internationalist" role by announcing that the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces was no longer exclusively "defense of the homeland." This doctrinal change suggested (and subsequently substantiated through action) that the USSR would more strongly defend its interests abroad. [Ref. 26: p. 68] Any U.S. military involvement around the world is, however, perceived as unjust because it supports the politics of imperialism.

The Soviets also define wars by their scale. They recognize the possibility of both local and world war, with the realization that the former could escalate into the latter. Furthermore, either conventional or nuclear weapons could be used, and the possibility of escalation from conventional to nuclear "is not ruled out." However, they reject the notion of "limited nuclear war," stating that there can be no institutional mechanism for controlling the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, they contend that "any attempt to employ nuclear weapons will lead to all-out, universal nuclear war." [Ref. 53]

The Soviets state that the U.S. and NATO have built up their armed forces in the pursuit of world domination and preparation for launching such a war. They justify their own military build-up and the maintenance of parity with the West (if not superiority) as a means of "restraining the imperialist 'hawks'" through "fear of retaliation." [Ref. 53] This restraint translates into "deterrence" from a U.S. perspective and suggests that the Soviet Union might consider the fear of MAD a deterrent in itself. At this point the conscious avoidance of value-projection becomes crucial because the Soviets do <u>not</u> in fact consider MAD a credible deterrent option. It is irrelevant to their nuclear warfighting strategy, which is based upon <u>surviving</u> a U.S. first strike and simultaneously launching a crushing retaliatory strike. In this respect, war is still an

extension of politics and deterrence is a means, not an end [Ref. 26: p. 98].

It is from this perspective that the Soviets respond to the question of the irrationality of using nuclear weapons, the idea that they "break the link between politics and war." The answer is that such a view is unscientific and a result of the "idealization" of these weapons. The Soviets explain that changes in technology do not change the political essence of war. [Ref. 14: p. 35] A review of the actual "laws of war" and "laws of armed conflict" will provide a better understanding of Soviet views on war because they believe that conformity to these laws will bring success to the "just" warfighter.

2. The Laws of War and Armed Conflict

The Soviets contend that war, like all else in the world, is governed by scientific laws which can only be understood through Marxism-Leninism. A knowledge of these laws is considered

> an essential prerequisite of successfully solving the fundamental problems of defending socialism, strengthening the defense capability of the nation and the combat might of the armed forces and achieving victory in a war. [Ref. 54]

These laws are included in the development of military policy, expressed in military doctrine, and serve as the basis of military science. The Soviets believe that war would be left to coincidental circumstances and chance without such laws. Although the laws of war are considered

universal, the Soviets contend that the unscientific nature of U.S. military thought limits its ability to understand and apply them. Furthermore, they are not steadfast doctrine in the USSR, but debatable and still being discovered or interpreted. [Ref. 55: p. 49] The laws presented here are taken from a textbook written in 1982 which is used in higher military schools [Ref. 54].

The first group of laws is entitled the "general laws of war" and encompasses war as a whole. This group includes:

* The laws governing the dependence of war, its scale and fierceness upon the policy and political goals of the [warring] sides.

* The laws governing the outbreak of wars from the nature of antagonistic socio-economic formations and from the aggressive policy inherent to exploiting classes.

* The laws determining the dependence of the overall method of waging the war upon the method of production [scientific potential].

* The laws reflecting the dependence of the course and outcome of a war upon the balance of the economic, scientific-technical, moral-political and particularly the military potentials of the belligerent forces (classes, states, coalitions). [Ref. 54]

These laws include some of the principles and characteristics of war already discussed. The first law presents the political essence of war, while the second concerns its economic foundations. Interestingly, the scope of these seemingly rhetorical laws is often greater than might be imagined. For example, the Soviets include the production and advance stockpile of reserve weapons,

equipment, foodstuffs, and raw materials in the economic equation of the second law [Ref. 55: p. 50]. In short, these laws define war, its origins, its methods, and the factors affecting its outcome. An understanding of their tenets affords the U.S. officer not only a more accurate perception of his Soviet counterparts but an opportunity to exploit Soviet weaknesses and his own strengths during either peacetime or war [Ref. 55: p. 50].

The next group of laws includes more specific principles and is entitled the "general laws of armed conflict." This group is not particularly different from the first, but important in that it makes a distinction between "war" and "armed conflict." One must remember that armed conflict is a subordinate element of war which begins after political methods have failed in attaining one's objectives. In this regard, war exists without armed conflict. In essence, these laws "disclose armed conflict as a single bilateral process" and are "examined predominantly within military science, and are a subject of the general theory of military art." [Ref. 54] They are as follows:

* The law of the dependence of the course and outcome of the armed struggle on the relationship of forces (combat might) of the belligerent sides.

* The law of the interrelationship of military actions, of their correspondence to political and military goals.

* The law of the unity [effective command and control] of military actions.

* The law of uneveness of the distribution [decisive concentration] of men and equipment. [Ref. 55: p. 51]

Although the semantics of these definitions are somewhat vague, this group is obviously subordinate to the "general laws of war" and reemphasizes armed conflict's dependence on political, economic, and technological factors.

The third group of laws is the "particular laws of armed conflict" and is implemented at various levels of armed combat (battles, army and front-level operations) and operations (offensive, defensive) and accounts for the nature of the involved forces (an army, partisans, and civil defense) and area of combat (air, sea, ocean, land) [Ref. 54]. These laws are studied at the level of strategy, operational art, and tactics. Although not generally published in available military literature, they are identifiable through careful research [Ref. 55: p. 51]. Again, they are subject to debate and differences, depending upon the source.

This presentation of Soviet concepts of war provides the U.S. officer with several useful insights in evaluating the Soviet from his own perspective. First, a knowledge of the laws of war and armed conflict can be applied not only to an encounter with the enemy, but to peacetime training and education through more effective wargaming with a realistic Soviet force. Second, English language translations of Soviet literature are initially difficult to

understand due to contextual and even grammatical differences between English and Russian. Hopefully, the quotes and excerpts presented here have enabled the reader to better "decipher" the often cryptic Soviet rhetoric and extract the important elements without dismissing it as propaganda. Later in this chapter the subject of translations will be addressed even further. Third, the concepts presented here will assist the reader in analyzing U.S. views of war and their contrast with the Soviet laws. Finally, the dangers of value-projection should be more obvious with this understanding. The importance of avoiding the "mirror-image" cannot be overstated.

> Yet the mirror image has endured in various forms in the West for decades. It is simpler and far less painful to ascribe to an opponent's intentions or strategies that are congenial, rather than to expend the effort to study him. We should not reject Soviet concepts because they fail to reflect ours. The challenge presents itself clearly: every effort expended to study our adversary acts as a hedge against serious error in time of war. [Ref. 14: p. 36]

B. THE LANGUAGES OF WAR

U.S. attitudes towards war differ greatly from those of the Soviet Union. The concepts to be presented here will reinforce the seriousness of understanding these differences and avoiding value-projection. This section will first present an American perspective on war and related tendencies in dealing with the Soviet threat. This will be followed by a presentation of Soviet and U.S. views of

peaceful coexistence, detente, glasnost, and perestroyka. These concepts are central to evaluating either society's perception of war. It must be reemphasized that the goal here is not to decide which perspective provides a better formula for victory, but to approach the enemy from his own perspective and to use the resulting knowledge when evaluating his actions.

1. An American Perspective

> American scenarios stop with the nuclear explosions. In that sense, our war plans end where the Soviet war plans begin. Although there will be armies in the field, the military operation is assumed to have stopped where the imagination did.
>
> The last Soviet battle does not take place when the missiles have ceased to fly, but when the revolutionary executions against the wall have stopped. [Ref. 24: pp. 43, 31]

These differences in Soviet and American perceptions of nuclear war have their origins in the early years after World War II. The Soviet Union's technological inferiority forced it to rely on the human factor and, consequently, the psychological warfare of manipulation, deceit, and surprise. The United States, on the other hand, was able to concentrate its superior forces on capabilities while downplaying the role of troops. The result of this U.S. emphasis was the development of an "abstractness of war" by the early 1970s. The progress made in the policy of detente was allowing the U.S. to relax its armed forces. [Ref. 24: pp. 37-39]

In 1972, at the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, this abstractness and relaxation had profound effects on the school's curricula.[5] That year the NWC eliminated all courses on the Soviet Union, as well as any discussion of intentions (Soviet or U.S.). Capabilities of U.S. forces were discussed, but not those of other nations. This apparently made it difficult to teach modern strategy and tactics, as the USSR was the only comparable naval adversary. These changes went so far as to ignore Russian battles when studying the eighteenth-century history of land warfare! [Ref. 24] Although the result was an extreme non-recognition of the enemy,

> the language did reflect the American mood . . . at least for that time and place. The U.S. concept was that war could be made moral by translating it through its historical evolution, into some universal laws that would apply to all weapons and all nations. What was being proposed was a reduction of the idea of military violence to the study of its use in police-like action. [Ref. 24: p. 34]

This internal elimination of the enemy is not surprising when U.S. historical experiences of war are considered. As mentioned in Chapter I, adequate threat perception is difficult in an predominantly isolationist society. The institutional non-recognition of a Soviet

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[5]This account was given by Robert Bathurst in "The Two Languages of War." [Ref. 24] Bathurst is a retired Navy Captain who served as an instructor at the NWC in 1972. He also served a tour as Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow (1965-67).

threat in the 1970s simply reflected the American views of detente and peaceful coexistence. However, given the Soviet definitions and applications of these concepts, such an outlook was potentially disastrous.

2. Detente and Peaceful Coexistence

Detente emerged in 1969 as a replacement for the Cold War. The Nixon/Kissinger detente strategy included:

* Acknowledgment of the "superpower" status of the USSR.
* A willingness to legitimize the division of Europe.
* A variety of agreements with the USSR to further mutual cooperation and make economic/technical assistance available.
* Development of a new set of norms (status quo) and rules for competition between the two superpowers. [Ref. 56: pp. 134-36]

In the United States, detente was considered not only a "relaxation of tensions" (its literal meaning translated from French), but a step towards friendship as well. Unfortunately, the American definition of detente failed to recognize the Soviet view. While the Russian language equivalent to detente, razryadka, also translates into "relaxation of tensions," it has no implication of friendship, cooperation, change of policy, or agreement [Ref. 7: p. 9]. In fact, detente allowed the USSR to continue its high level of international involvement and its journey towards inevitable Communist victory. The following statement by Leonid Brezhnev best describes the Soviet perception of detente:

> Detente does not in the slightest abolish, and it cannot abolish or alter the laws of class struggle. . . . We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as a path leading to the creation of more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction. [Ref. 57]

Furthermore, the Soviet concept of detente is considered only in the broader context of "peaceful coexistence." In the United States, peaceful coexistence assumes that the two superpowers will be able to occupy the globe together, indefinitely, without conflict. The Soviets do not embrace such an attractive attitude. They consider coexistence another form of conflict between the two ideologies until Capitalism is defeated. This defeat (like the conflict) need not be military in nature. Because of the political and economic bases of war and society, the fall of Capitalist economies and governments is the prerequisite for Communist victory. This ideological war will include armed conflict only if political methods fail. The following Soviet statements should be adequate in providing the reader with a Soviet perspective of peaceful coexistence. These attitudes bring our discussion back to the initial Marxist-Leninist principle of constant struggle until the final "synthesis."

> Peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states, between these two systems is not a class peace but a specific form of class struggle, one which has the objective of excluding war from the arsenal of the resources of foreign policy. In the condition of peaceful coexistence, socialism and capitalism are waging an acute struggle which does not escalate into war. [Ref. 58]

> The Marxist-Leninist Parties hold that the policy of peaceful coexistence of governments with different social regimes does not lead (and cannot lead) to ideological peace between the two systems, and, on the whole, class opposed forces. On the contrary, it objectively imparts to the most ideological struggle with imperialism an even sharper nature, demanding increased violence with respect to enemy intrigues, and the timely exposure of its ideological diversions. [Ref. 59]

With this understanding, it becomes necessary to address those current Soviet policies which have great potential for similar Western misinterpretation. Although they are not frequently addressed in a military context, their intended effect on military affairs is becoming understood with time.

3. Glasnost and Perestroyka

While the strength and outcome of these policies are yet to be realized, they already have important implications in Soviet society. They are primarily domestic policies not widely discussed in a military context and are not directly related to Soviet concepts of war. Nevertheless, their importance in this forum lies in their potential for misunderstanding in the West. The respective translations of glasnost and perestroyka into openness and restructuring serve as the roots of such a misunderstanding.[6]

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[6]Therefore, this discussion will use the terms glasnost and perestroyka when referring to the policies as they exist in the USSR, and will use openness and restructuring only when referring to their American interpretations.

When glasnost is defined as openness in the U.S. press an image is projected of a society which is moving closer to American ideals of freedom as expressed in the U.S. Constitution. This is understandable because glasnost is often discussed in terms of demokraticheskii tsentralizm [democratic centralism]. This concept is, in fact, included in Article 3 of the Constitution of the USSR [Ref. 60]. In a Soviet context, democracy actually supports the dictatorial powers. Lenin has been quoted as explaining socialist democracy as follows:

> Soviet socialist democracy is not the least incompatible with individual rule and dictatorship. . . . What is necessary is individual rule, the recognition of the dictatorial powers of one man. . . . All phrases about equal rights are nonsense. [Ref. 61: p. 2]

From this perspective glasnost does not mean a move towards Western democracy, and the reforms implemented under glasnost are not meant to change the structure of Soviet society. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has reaffirmed that the principles of Party rule "remain unshakeable." [Ref. 61: p. 3] Glasnost's effects thus far seem to be only a loosening of controls on the Soviet citizen in such areas as public expression, private enterprise, and local elections, to name a few. There are, however, limits to this loosening, and glasnost does not permit freedoms to the extent of those afforded Americans in the Bill of Rights. The changes which are being made are not ends in themselves, but means towards an end which promotes the forces of

Communism. Like peaceful coexistence and detente, glasnost does not offer to exchange the pursuit of Communism for Western democratic ideals and the elimination of conflict with Capitalism.

Similarly, perestroyka should not be confused with the restructuring of Soviet society. It is more accurately a method for raising the consciousness and discipline of the society, and of encouraging a subsequent (and wiser) sense of initiative [Ref. 62]. Obviously, perestroyka has important implications for the military, as it actually reinforces the discipline of the collective rather than restructuring the military establishment. An example of perestroyka in several Soviet airborne assault units is provided in the following passage:

> . . . they began restructuring [perestroyka] . . . to radically improve military discipline by developing the communists' aggressiveness, animation, vigor, and sense of principle. Everything was done so that every communist would work more intensely, and there was a sharp turn from mobilizing people toward strictly organizing the performance of tasks to strengthen order and discipline in all lines, and mainly on the personal level . . . In party influence on people, preference was given to preventing violations and to individual work directly in the companies, batteries, and platoons, where military skills are forged. [Ref. 63]

This review of Soviet concepts should make obvious the differences between Russian language terms and their English translations. The U.S. officer must understand that translations are themselves only perceptions and can assume the cultural biases of the society in which they are used.

This makes the task of understanding the Soviet perspective more difficult because accurate translations depend upon the proficiency of the translator, who must be trained not only in language skills but in the culture of the target nation and in the subject being translated [Ref. 64]. Obviously, every translation of Soviet military literature cannot be performed by an expert translator. Therefore, the U.S. analyst of the Soviet military must be aware not only his own biases but of the translator's possible mistakes as well. Hopefully this presentation has provided the reader with a better understanding of the Soviet perspective and an awareness of those biases to be avoided in threat analysis.

VII. CONCLUSION

The swift development of new technology and the resulting application of new hardware and modes of thought for its employment make threat analysis a never ending task. This thesis has addressed only a portion of Soviet military thought with a presentation of its foundation in Soviet and Russian ideology, influences, and thoughts on military affairs and war. Because of the seemingly endless volumes of Soviet military literature and the level of attention which studies of military affairs receive in the USSR, there is always one more topic to address or discuss more thoroughly and one more insight to be made. In fact, a review of the Soviet Armed Forces structure has intentionally been left out of this study because the scope of such a presentation would be immense, and excellent coverage of that structure is available in other sources, primarily The Armed Forces of the USSR [Ref. 26]. The concepts which have been reviewed here will aid the reader in understanding the differences between the Soviet and U.S. Armed Forces structures.

What must be remembered is that each nation has developed a military establishment which reflects its particular needs for security. These needs are determined by the ideological, cultural, and institutional values and

influences of the respective societies. As these differ, so do the armed forces which emerge. The following Soviet passage recognizes this fact very well.

> First of all the army is a state organization: It is maintained by the state, and it is an organ of the latter. It is created by the latter "in its own image and likeness." Whatever the state is in terms of its classlessness and content, so is the army that defends its interests. [Ref. 65]

This passage further addresses the "inseparable tie between the army and the people" by stating that the stronger these ties, the "higher are the moral and fighting qualities of the [military] personnel." It also mentions that such strength is not possible in an "imperialist army" and uses Vietnam as an example where U.S. troops consequently lost morale in the face of increasing opposition. The importance of these statements lies not in the allegations made against the U.S. forces but again in recognizing the differences between the Soviet and American perspectives. Each state has indeed developed a military "in its own image and likeness": the United States emphasizing individualism, and the Soviet Union--a collective. These differences are similar to those noted in the comparison of oaths in Chapter III.

In this regard, the five primary Soviet Armed Services: the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy are integrated under a combined arms concept of one military strategy. As presented

earlier, an individual service can contribute to the achievement of strategic goals, but cannot singularly determine the course and outcome of war.

While there is a tendency to relate the Soviet concept of combined arms to U.S. (or NATO) Joint Forces, such comparisons are fundamentally flawed because of the differences in scope. For example, there are sixteen Soviet Military Districts which have operational command over the Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, and frontal aviation. While this might be considered a Joint Command in the West, the Soviet District commander has force-levels at his disposal which would not be possible in the NATO structure. In fact, the Military Districts are structured to become fronts in wartime. [Ref. 26: pp. 188-90]

An additional field which could be afforded more attention is that of how to analyze Soviet military literature so as not to become the victim of disinformation. This subject is addressed by William F. Scott in Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy. Although this work was published 12 years ago, it remains an invaluable source for "deciphering" the content and authority of almost every Soviet Military periodical, as well as several books. Scott analyzes those periodicals and books which have served as indoctrination tools for Soviet military personnel through contributions to the development doctrine and strategy. In this analysis he addresses the differences

between the open content of American military literature and comparable Soviet literature.

Interestingly enough, the Soviets encounter a greater problem in studying U.S. military affairs than do their American counterparts in studying Soviet military affairs. Imagine the difficulty a Soviet analyst might have in filtering through the sea of public information emanating from the United States. While the U.S. analyst must learn to filter declaratory propaganda and disinformation from actual doctrine, the Soviet analyst must decide between what is doctrine, debate, and simply opinion. Furthermore, he must decide for himself how authoritative each American military spokesman is. This is much more difficult than the "Kremlinologist's" task because debate is more prevalent in the U.S. military structure. Policy may be disagreed with to a greater extent than in the USSR. Soviet analysts may be puzzled when subordinates publicly disagree with a senior's decision. While debate is used in Soviet military literature as a forum for policy development, it ceases when the final decision is made. The Soviets occasionally make reference to their belief that the mass of seemingly contradictory information flowing from the U.S. is indeed a method of deception [Ref. 17]. This represents the existence of Soviet mirror-imaging because deception and disinformation are accepted methods in Soviet military thought.

This introduction to the Soviet perspective should, at the very least, make the reader conscious of the dangers of mirror-imaging and the necessity for assuming a different perspective. Such a conscious effort is the beginning of proper threat perception, which can subsequently be applied as an element of threat analysis. While hardware and weapon parameters are the primary element of this equation, means of employment at every level from doctrinal to tactical are decided upon by a commander who receives his perspective from the ideological, cultural, and institutional influences discussed here.

There is no better method of knowing the enemy than to study him. As mentioned before, this education must begin early and be constant throughout a career. Education need not (and cannot) always be formal, but simply a part of every officer's self-generated professional development. At a very minimum, the Soviet Military Thought series, translated and published by the U.S. Air Force, should be a part of every command's library. The series' declared purpose is, after all, "the exchange and stimulation of ideas." Much insight can be gained from simply reading The Officer's Handbook (number 13 in the series). The "General Reference Data" included in Chapter 12 of that publication is in itself quite interesting. In addition to pertinent information found in similar U.S. handbooks, the Soviets include items such as almanac data for 177 different

nations, the solar system, the worlds oceans, seas, and straits; as well as the fundamentals of physics, geometry, and electricity. While this point may seem trivial, and different views may be taken as to why such data is included for the Soviet officer's knowledge, it is important because it serves as a portion (however insignificant) of the Soviet perspective.

A fitting conclusion is simply to encourage an introduction. The books and articles used in research for this thesis were purposely chosen from open sources available to anyone with access to an adequate library or academic bookstore (with the exception of a few unpublished papers). This was done in the hope that the reader might take advantage of additional research. Such study is the key to evaluating the enemy properly. In this regard, the List of References and Bibliography serve as invaluable sources to the cumulative knowledge of both Western and Soviet analysts and theorists on Soviet military affairs. Hopefully this thesis has served as such an introduction to "Understanding the Soviet Threat."

APPENDIX: MILITARY INDOCTRINATION AND SERVICE

The following overview of Soviet military indoctrination and service is taken from Reference 66 and is intended to provide a concise review of the Soviet citizens unique experiences in pre-draft schooling and active service.

1. At age 6, formal education begins; eleven years of schooling required.

2. At age 7, children are encouraged to join youth groups. Groups include Little Octobrists (ages 7-9), Young Pioneers (10-14/15), and Komsomol, the All-Union Communist Union of Youth (14-28).

3. At age 15, Soviet teenagers begin military training and receive a minimum of 140 hours before induction. Boys get thirty additional hours during summer camp. First aid is emphasized for girls.

4. By age 17, all males must register for military service. They may be assigned to specific training prior to induction.

5. Soviet law provides for conscription of women, but in practice this is not done. However, women may volunteer. A very few women are commissioned officers.

6. Few deferments from military service are granted; the majority of these allow selected students to attend approved schools to learn skills critically needed by the state or military. Males enroll concurrently in Reserve Officer Training (ROT). In rare instances, males may be deferred for health or family reasons and excused from their active commitment upon reaching age 27.

7. At age 18, most Soviet males are inducted for enlisted service. Call-ups are held semi-annually in the Spring and Fall. Conscripts rarely have a choice of service or branch. The usual term of service is two years for the Army and Navy ashore and three years for the Navy afloat.

8. Males who qualify by competitive examination and political recommendation may attend one of about 140 higher military schools. These schools are the primary sources of active duty officers.

9. The Soviet military does not have an "up-or-out" policy for officers, but does impose maximum ages on active service according to rank. An officer who reaches his maximum age but is not eligible for retirement will be transferred to the reserves.

10. The Soviet armed services require a large number of reserve officers. Citizens receiving reserve commissions may spend their entire careers as part-time reservists, or they may be called to a period of active duty, particularly if they possess critical skills.

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